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Introduction
The immediate goals of patent and antitrust policy are necessarily in conflict
with each other. While antitrust law promotes competition by limiting the frequen-
cy and scope of monopolies, patent law creates time-limited monopolies to encour-
age investment in research and development.' If a patent grant is a special excep-
tion to the anti-monopoly goals of competition law, then the proper scope of this
exception is often difficult to define.
For almost a century, courts and commentators categorized questions at the
intersection of patent and antitrust as belonging to either one domain or the other,
condoning some patentee practices as rewarding invention and condemning others
for reducing competition.2 This vacillation between patent and antitrust goals led
to indeterminate rules and sometimes conflicting outcomes.3 Louis Kaplow recog-
nized this problem in 1984, and noted that solving the patent-antitrust dilemma re-
quired coordination with other aspects of patent policy. 4 Kaplow's Reappraisal
spawned a wealth of literature aimed at increasing the efficiency of patent policy,
typically by comparing the costs and benefits of patent-antitrust rules with the po-
tential costs and benefits available by other changes in patent policy.5
Despite these advances, the existing approaches to patent system design tend
to treat the costs and benefits of granting patent monopolies as if they were fully
See Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate
Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 171 (1997) (explaining that the purpose of pa-
tent law is to protect the patentee in the monopoly of his invention, forming a mirror image to the
purpose of anti-monopoly laws in antitrust).
2 See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813,





See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEx. L. REv. 253, 272 (2009) (using Kaplow's
analysis as a starting point for analyzing patent rights); Yonatan Even, The Right of Integrity in
Software: An Economic Analysis, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 219, 222-23
(2006) (criticizing the lack of economic analysis in intellectual property law).
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internalized by a single national economy. 6 Today, however, there is significant
interplay among various patent systems.' Substantial international spillovers, pri-
marily of benefits, create opportunities for countries to behave strategically in their
implementation of patent policy. For example, many countries benefit from ad-
vancements stimulated by patent protection, regardless of whether that patent pro-
tection is offered within their borders or elsewhere.8  Acting unilaterally, such
countries may rationally decide to forgo the costs of operating a domestic patent
system, while continuing to enjoy the benefits of other jurisdictions' patent sys-
tems.
This collective action problem calls for formal coordination; accordingly,
significant moves have been made towards standardizing the patent rights available
around the world. Most prominently, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) sets substantive, minimal patent protections
that all signatories must provide.9 However, analogous antitrust harmonization ef-
forts have repeatedly stalled.'o As a result, questions at the patent-antitrust inter-
section have been largely left to national discretion. Despite the appearance of in-
ternational standards, significant components of substantive patent policy remain in
the hands of national policymakers.
Although the literature on international patent cooperation is extensive, com-
mentators have generally focused on the distributional consequences of internation-
al patent protection, rather than on how an agreed-upon amount of patent protection
might be optimally implemented." As a result, the efficiency of international pa-
6
See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Example,
77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 2 (2008) (criticizing prior analysis of patent policy as too narrow).
Although it only tells part of the story, the frequency of cross-border patent filing illustrates the
magnitude of international spillovers across patent systems. Of the ten companies filing the most
U.S. patent applications in 2008, six were headquartered in another country. See Press Release,
IBM, IBM Shatters U.S. Patent Record; Will Openly Publish Many More Future Inventions; IBM
Research to Work on Patent Quality Index (Jan. 14, 2009), http://www-
03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/26471.wss (listing the ten companies). In 2008, almost 50%
of all U.S. patent applications designated a country of origin outside the United States. Econom-
ics & Statistics Division, WIPO, World Intellectual Property Indicators 2010, 48 (Sept. 2010),
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents. Worldwide, non-resident applications accounted
for 44% of total patent applications in 2008. Id. at 35. During the same year, U.S. inventors filed
more than 37% percent of all new international applications before the World International Prop-
erty Organization (WIPO). Id. at 48.
See infra Part 1I.B (discussing how various economies capture the benefits of rewarding invention
with varying effectiveness).
9 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 36, Dec. 15, 1993, 33
I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
Daniel A. Crane, Substance, Procedure, and Institutions in the International Harmonization of
Competition Policy, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 143, 143 (2009).
See, e.g., Judith C. Chin & Gene M. Grossman, Intellectual Property Rights and North-South
Trade, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E.
BALDWIN 90, 90-106 (Ronald W. Jones & Anne 0. Krueger eds., 1990) (discussing the effects of
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tent cooperation remains largely unaddressed; the single-jurisdiction literature does
not consider the international effects of rewarding invention, while the international
literature does not evaluate the competing means for offering that reward.
This Article models the costs and benefits of offering patent protection when
there are spillovers from other patent jurisdictions. It predicts how national policy-
makers will behave-both with and without formal coordination-and evaluates
the consequences of their predicted behavior. This analysis suggests that the cur-
rent international patent regime is inadequate, and that improved outcomes are
available through increased cooperation.
Part I of this Article provides background on the tension between patent and
antitrust law and describes several approaches that have been used to address the
problem. This Article also introduces the international frameworks affecting patent
and antitrust policy today.
Part II of this Article models the costs and benefits of operating a national pa-
tent system when the rewards of stimulating innovation are shared across econo-
mies. The model predicts how a rational policymaker will set patent terms and pa-
tent-antitrust policies, both in the presence and in the absence of a patent treaty
constraining the policymaker's behavior.
Part III of this Article uses the model from Part II to demonstrate that the ex-
isting international patent regime is expected to lead to suboptimal results. It then
discusses the necessity and feasibility of improving the existing regime through in-
creased coordination of patent-antitrust policies.
Part IV of this Article examines the assumptions of the model and evaluates
other factors that could cause the existing regime to produce outcomes better than
expected. Part V concludes this Article.
I. Background
A. What is the Patent-Antitrust Intersection?
A patent is a state-granted right to exclude others from making, using, selling,
or importing an invention.12 This right comprises two parts: state-provided en-
forcement mechanisms, such as a civil cause of action in U.S. District Court,' 3 and
patent protection in a country that does not produce new inventions); MEIR PEREZ PUGATCH, THE
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 49-64 (2004) (discuss-
ing the effects of an international intellectual property system on the production of intellectual
property related products); Arvind Subramanian, Putting Some Numbers on the TRIPs Pharma-
ceutical Debate, 10 INT'L J. TECH. MGMT. 1, 1-17 (1994) (discussing the effects of patent protec-
tion on pharmaceuticals).
12 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 28.
13 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006). U.S. patents can also serve as the basis of a complaint of unfair competi-
tion before the U.S. International Trade Commission. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2006).
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antitrust immunity for conduct that might objectively reduce competition.14 A pa-
tent holder has a prima facie right to monopolize the patented product and can in-
voke the authority of the state to do so. 15
However, patent ownership does not create blanket antitrust immunity. For
example, courts have held that patentees exceeded the scope of their lawful mono-
polies by charging royalties on expired patents, tying the sale of patented products
to the sale of unpatented products, and unreasonably restricting resale of patented
goods.16 A patentee could find his attempted restriction on the licensee unenforce-
able, or in some cases, be subject to antitrust damages for his conduct. Courts have
viewed other licensing constraints, such as field-of-use restrictions or production
limits on licensed products, more favorably.' 7 The antitrust limitations on paten-
tees have also changed over time, both through judicial and regulatory decision-
making.'
There are often significant differences in patent-antitrust policy across juris-
dictions. For example, the European Commission (EC) is particularly hostile to
14
For the purposes of this Article, "patentee antitrust immunity" refers the set of patent-related prac-
tices a patentee may undertake without incurring antitrust liability. See United States v. Line Ma-
terial Co., 333 U.S. 287, 310 (1948) ("The monopoly granted by the patent laws is a statutory ex-
ception to this freedom for competition."); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d
Cir. 1981) ("[W]here a patent has been lawfully acquired, subsequent conduct permissible under
the patent laws cannot trigger any liability under the antitrust laws."). The European Commission
also has explicit-though malleable-antitrust exceptions for intellectual property holders. See
Commission Regulation 772/2004, art. 2, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 11, 11-13 (EC) [hereinafter Commis-
sion Regulation] (exempting certain technology transfer agreements from antitrust agreements).
15
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)-(4) (2006) (giving patent holders rights to refuse to license and to sue
for infringement); 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006) (authorizing injunctive relief).
16
See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992) (holding that a tying
agreement violates the Sherman Act); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964) (holding that
royalties on expired patents are unenforceable and are impermissible monopolies); Int'l Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947) (holding that a patent cannot be used to restrict the
use of an unpatented product by tying the unpatented product to a patented product); United States
v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251-52 (1942) (holding that an unreasonable resale restriction
on a patented item violates the Sherman Act). In recent years, however, there has been a shift in
enforcement of antitrust laws such that courts more often evaluate patentee practices under a rule
of reason. See Robert D. Anderson, The Interface Between Competition Policy and Intellectual
Property in the International Trading System, I J. INT'L EcON. L. 655, 663 (1998) (explaining that
antitrust enforcement has become less regimented and more liberal).
17
Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Electric Co., 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938) (upholding field-of-use
licenses); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(holding that limiting the number of licensed game cartridges does not constitute a per se violation
of antitrust law).
18 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007) (overturning the rule
that it is per se in violation of the Sherman Act for a manufacturer to set minimum prices that dis-
tributors must charge); see Anderson, supra note 16, at 662-65 (describing changes in U.S. regu-
lations).
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territorial restrictions, a practice that Japan has consistently allowed.'9 The EC is
also skeptical of price maintenance clauses, which are subject to more lenient
treatment for both patentees and non-patentees in the United States. 20 Courts have
resolved other questions of patent-antitrust policy more consistently across jurisdic-
tions. For example, the United States, E.C., and Japan uniformly condemn collec-
tion of royalties after a patent has expired.2 1 Many of the policies that differ from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction have a substantial impact on an inventor's reward.
A patent-antitrust controversy arises anytime a patentee engages in patent-
related conduct that reduces competition. Broadly, the legal questions come in two
flavors: what kinds of contractual restrictions will a court enforce, and what prac-
tices may a patentee engage in without being liable under antitrust laws. Antitrust
immunities are the competition-reducing activities a patentee may undertake with-
out either losing rights or incurring liability. Practices within these bounds consti-
tute legal exploitation of the patent; other activities are sanctionable anticompeti-
tive conduct.
B. Theories of the Patent-Antitrust Intersection
Early attempts to define the bounds of patent protection achieved nebulous
and often contradictory results. For example, one case noted that "the primary pur-
pose of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of pa-
19
See Anderson, supra note 16, at 665-67 (noting EC and Japanese approaches to licensing). The
United States is also comparatively more tolerant of restrictions on the location of resale. See
Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 (1977) (holding there is no per se bar
against restrictions on territory).
20 Compare Commission Regulation, supra note 14, at art. 4 (singling out price maintenance clauses
as "hardcore restrictions"), with Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889-92 (noting numerous justifications for
resale price maintenance). See also ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE REGULATION OF PATENT LICENSING AND COLLABORATIVE
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 265-326
(1997) (providing a detailed comparison of patent-antitrust policies in Europe and in the United
States).
21
See Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 32 (stating that "a patentee's use of a royalty agreement that projects
beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se"); Guidelines for the Use of Intellectual
Property Under the Antimonopoly Act, JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, 21 (2007),
http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/070928_IPGuideline.pdf (imposing royalties after
the patent term expires is an "unfair trade practice if it tends to impede fair competition"); Com-
mission Decision of 2 December 1975 76/29/EEC, 1976 O.J. (L 6) 8 ("The obligation to pay
royalties after the expiration of the most recent patent in force when the agreement was made con-
stitutes, in this case, an infringement of Article 85 because the licensee does not have the right to
terminate the agreement."). Paradoxically, this rare instance of international agreement reaches a
result that is widely thought to be unjustifiable. See Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014,
1017-18 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing the Brulotte decisions and problems with it); Harold See &
Frank M. Caprio, The Trouble with Brulotte: The Patent Royalty Term and Patent Monopoly Ex-
tension, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 813, 814, 851 (explaining that royalties paid after the expiration of
the patent term do not "represent an extension in time of the patent monopoly").
198 [VOL. 19:193
International Cooperation and the Patent-Antitrust Intersection
tents, but is 'to promote the progress of science and the useful arts."' 2 2 This finding
suggested a stem approach to patentees, who may have exceeded the scope of their
patents the moment they attempted to collect royalties. But another case held that a
practice was acceptable so long as it was "reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary
reward for the patentee's monopoly."23 By invoking one principle or the other, a
court could justify almost any outcome in a conflict between patent and antitrust
law. Courts could condone a restrictive licensing practice by finding that the prac-
tice rewards patentees, 24 while condemning a similar restrictive licensing practice
by finding that it harms competition.2 5
Other cases looked to the scope of the invention itself to determine whether a
patentee was acting within the proper bounds of his patent, reasoning that a paten-
tee should have "exclusive use of just what his inventive genius has discovered."2 6
Within those bounds, a patentee could seek the reward that he was "entitled to se-
cure,"27 provided that he did not do anything "in [its] very nature illegal."28
Given these hazy boundaries, it was difficult for an inventor to know in ad-
vance whether he was undertaking a practice that was "in its very nature illegal" or
was merely seeking the reward he was "entitled to secure." The use of these con-
clusive terms as a test for patentee practices was inherently circular and could not
inform a decision as to which combination of patentee rights would optimally pro-
duce the desired reward for invention.
Louis Kaplow's landmark Reappraisal transformed the apparent conflict be-
tween patent and antitrust policy into a balancing test in service of a common
goal. 2 9 Kaplow introduced a cost-benefit framework allowing for rational compari-
son of various policy options.3 0 The social benefits of a patent system, he noted,
are obtained as a result of rewarding patentees, while the costs of the patent system
come in the form of deadweight losses from patent monopolies.3 ' Kaplow argued
22 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8).
United States v. Gen. Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926).
24 See id. (allowing a price-restricted license so long as it was "reasonably adapted to secure pecu-
niary reward for the patentee's monopoly").
25 See, e.g., Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947) (holding that tying a patent
license to the purchase of commodity inputs was per se anticompetitive).
26 Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 513.
27 Gen. Electric, 272 U.S. at 489.
28 See E. Bement & Sons v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902) (noting that agreements will
generally be upheld unless they impose conditions that are illegal).
29 See Kaplow, supra note 2, at 1822-23 (stating that patent law and antitrust law should operate
together to provide a given level of protection at the lowest cost).
30 Id. at 1816.
Id.
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that candidate patent policies should be evaluated by comparing the policies' poten-
tial wealth transfer to patentees to the deadweight loss they could be expected to
cause the society-the "ratio test."32
Kaplow's ratio test evaluates antitrust immunities just like the length of a pa-
tent's term, the scope of a patent's exclusivity, or any other aspect of patent poli-
cy-each having the potential to increase or decrease a patentee's reward at the
cost or savings of some incremental deadweight ioss. 3 3 Kaplow called for classify-
ing policies according to the reward they deliver to patentees per unit of dead-
weight Ioss. 34 An optimal patent system would start with the policies producing the
greatest patentee reward per unit of deadweight loss, then gradually add increasing-
ly inferior patentee rights until the marginal benefit to society from the increased
incentive to invent is no longer offset by the marginal deadweight loss.35
Kaplow acknowledged that lack of empirical data may make it difficult to
implement the perfect patent system, 36 but his framework was nonetheless a break-
through because it allowed for meaningful comparison of candidate patent policies.
After nearly a century of indeterminate formalisms, there now existed a rational
method for comparing one patent-antitrust policy to another.
Kaplow's model treated the costs and benefits of granting patent monopolies
as if they were fully internalized by a single national economy.3 7 This assumption
is an elegant simplification and is inconsequential provided there are no significant
interactions across patent jurisdictions. However, developments in the last quarter-
century-the increased availability of foreign markets under the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO), the arrival of competent non-U.S. patent jurisdictions, and dra-
matic improvements in knowledge-sharing across borders-call for reexamination
of these assumptions. Moreover, various treaty commitments now constrain do-
mestic patent law.38 To effectively evaluate domestic patent policy, we must un-




Kaplow, supra note 2, at 1829-30.
Id. at 1830-31; see also Crane, supra note 5, at 271-72 (evaluating antitrust privileges as a stick
in the bundle of rights that may be given to patentees).
See Kaplow, supra note 2, at 1842-43 (noting potential problems in implementing the frame-
work).
Cf id. at 1819 (referring only to U.S. policymakers).
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9; Daniel S. Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? An Analysis
of Patent Duration and Incentives to Innovate, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1613, 1614 (2009) (citing nu-
merous regional treaties).
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C. International Treaties Affecting Patent-Antitrust Policy
Today, decisions about patent-antitrust policy take place against two distinct
backgrounds: extensive international cooperation in the realm of patent law and vir-
tually non-existent cooperation in the realm of antitrust law.
Antitrust harmonization efforts have been repeatedly unsuccessful. 39 The
1947 Havana Charter included basic antitrust provisions,4 0 but the U.S. Senate re-
jected the Charter and it never entered into force.4 1 The next several decades saw
further attempts at international antitrust standards, but ultimately yielded only a
non-binding Restrictive Business Practices Code. 42 Recent attempts to add compe-
tition policy to the WTO framework were thwarted when negotiators took the issue
off the agenda for the Doha Round in the summer of 2004.43 As a result of these
setbacks, countries remain largely unconstrained in their power to create and en-
force antitrust law."
Patent cooperation has a more extensive and successful history. Under the
1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention),
signatory countries committed to offer nationals of other signatory countries the
same opportunity to receive and enforce patent right as they offer to their own na-
39 See Damien Geradin, The Perils ofAntitrust Proliferation: The Globalization ofAntitrust and the
Risks of Overregulation of Competitive Behavior, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 189, 193-96 (2009) (discuss-
ing the failure of the International Trade Organization (ITO), the United Nations, and the WTO to
develop an antitrust agreement); Diane P. Wood, The Impossible Dream: Real International Anti-
trust, 1992 U. Cm. LEGAL. F. 277, 282-87 (1992) (discussing failed attempts of the ITO and the
United Nations in developing an international antitrust agreement); Anu Bradford, When the WTO
Works and How it Fails 12-13 (U. Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 300,
2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1569838.
40 United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba, Mar. 24, 1948, art. 46,
U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78 (Mar. 24,1948).
Wood, supra note 39, at 282-84.
42 Id. at 282-87.
43 See Decision of the General Council, Doha Work Programme-Decision Adopted by the General
Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004) ("Interaction between Trade and Competi-
tion Policy will not form part of the Work Programme ... and therefore no work towards negotia-
tions ... will take place within the WTO during the Doha Round."); Geradin, supra note 39, at
195 ("Such negotiations were cut short by the issuance of the August 2004 Decision by the Gen-
eral Council of the WTO, which stated that the 'Interaction between Trade and Competition Poli-
cy' would not form part of the Doha Work Program."); see also Andrew T. Guzman, The Case for
International Antitrust, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 99 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004) (discussing the desira-
bility of unified antitrust policy); David S. Evans, Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should
Not) Adopt the Same Antitrust Rules, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 161, 162-63 (2009) ("[C]ompetition au-
thorities should seek antitrust rules and enforcement measures that balance their local needs
against the costs of divergence to competition by multinational firms in a global economy.").
There are, however, several important regional antitrust treaties. See Geradin, supra note 39, at
193-94 (mentioning the European Union (E.U.), North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and Mercosur). However, with the exception of the E.U., none of these arrangements
are sufficiently specific to regulate patent-antitrust policy.
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tionals.45 The Paris Convention was quickly and broadly accepted.46 As a result,
almost every country in the world is formally committed to non-discrimination in
patent rights based on either citizenship or location of invention.
Notably, the Paris Convention does not require signatory countries to offer
any particular level of patent protection. So long as a signatory country offers the
same level of protection to all inventors regardless of nationality, it could offer a
trivial amount of protection and be in full compliance with the Convention.4 8 For
over a century, international patent law was nothing more than a promise of nation-
al treatment.
Subsequent patent treaties standardized the form of patent applications or
otherwise streamlined procedure, 4 9 but efforts to achieve global harmonization of
substantive rights were unsuccessful for many years. Finally, in 1994, minimum
patent protections were added to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) Uruguay Round.5 0 These provisions-known as the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)-became a requirement
for joining the World Trade Organization, and TRIPS was propelled to rapid and
widespread accession.5'
45
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 2, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1538,
828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
46
All the major capitalist economies had acceded to the Convention by the end of the 19th century;
today there are 173 signatories. World Intellectual Property Organization, Contracting Parties,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treatyid=2 (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
47
Subject only to the constraint that applicants be nationals of or have commercial establishments in
signatory countries. Paris Convention, supra note 45, at arts. 2 & 3. This limitation is slight due
to the sheer number of signatories.
48
Id. Indeed, Switzerland had no patent system for the first ten years of its membership until suc-
cumbing to pressure from Germany. See PUGATCH, supra note 11, at 65 (discussing Switzerland's
patent system adoption). The Paris Convention's lack of minimum protection guarantees is in
marked contrast to the approximately contemporaneous Beme Convention, which promised copy-
right holders both national treatment and minimum terms. Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works art. 7, Sept. 9, 1886, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27.
49
Patent Cooperation Treaty art. 3, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231; Convention
on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268 [hereinafter European Patent Con-
vention]; Patent Law Treaty and Regulations Under Patent Law Treaty arts. 3 & 6, June 1, 2000,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 109-12. The European Patent Convention partially standardized substantive
patent policy by providing a single examination procedure that would lead to the grant of a patent
enforceable in all signatory states. However, after going through this procedure, an inventor is
only entitled to whatever national rights were previously offered by the various patent systems.
See European Patent Convention, supra, at art. 64. The Paris Convention did not standardize the
contents of those national rights.
50
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATTS
1994].
51
There are now 153 member states and additional "observer" states. World Trade Organization,
Understanding the WTO: The Organization-Members and Observers,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/org6 e.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010) [he-
reinafter Members and Observers]; see also Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow ofLaw or Pow-
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TRIPS sets certain minima for patentee rights, including a mandatory patent
term and basic rights of exclusive use.52 It also specifies the standards by which
new applications should be evaluated. 53 It does not, however, require members to
provide any specific antitrust immunities to patentees. 54 Despite the close coordi-
nation of patent policy, questions of antitrust are largely delegated to member
states.ss
As a result of the divergent outcomes obtained from these parallel interna-
tional harmonization efforts, national patent polices today operate in two distinct
spheres. Issues thought to be at the core of patent protection are largely standar-
dized, while matters traditionally associated with antitrust law are left to national
discretion.
This Article now turns to evaluate how a policymaker pursuing his country's
self-interest can be expected to employ this discretion, as well as the consequences
for expected patentee rewards.
II. National Patent Systems with International Benefits
National patent policymakers do not make their decisions in a bubble; nearly
all domestic patent policies have effects, positive or negative, outside a country's
borders. Likewise, national patent policymakers should expect their domestic
economies to be affected by other countries' patent policies. Understanding the
cross-border consequences of national patent policy is the first step to evaluating
the potential for socially beneficial cooperation.
This section begins by presenting several assumptions useful for evaluating
how national patent jurisdictions interact. It then incorporates these assumptions
into a model for national policymaking.57 Finally, it evaluates this model under
several scenarios with varying degrees of policy coordination across jurisdictions.
A. An Inventor's Expected Reward Depends on Patent Regimes Around
the World
Today, an inventor is entitled to secure a patent not only in his home country
but in practically any jurisdiction in the world. Under the terms of the Paris Con-
er? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339, 345
(2002) (discussing the issue-linkage of intellectual property and free trade).
52
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, at arts. 28 & 33.
Id. at arts. 27 & 29.
See id. at arts. 8(2) & 40(2) (providing limited antitrust provisions).
This Article evaluates the antitrust requirements of the TRIPS Agreement in greater detail in Part
III.B, infra.
56
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, at arts. 27-34 (discussing standards for patent law regimes);
Bradford, supra note 39, at 2.
For an overview of Kaplow's framework, see supra Part I.B.
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vention, signatory countries, of which there are now 173, must afford foreigners the
same patent rights as the country's own nationals.ss Regardless of where he lives
or works, an inventor may file a patent application in the country of his choosing.
Although many inventors choose to file patent applications only in their home
countries, the option of filing for international protection is an important compo-
nent of an inventor's expected reward. Patents from some jurisdictions will be
worth more than others, but an inventor's total reward is based on the expected
benefits he will receive from countries around the world.
To simplify the analysis, the Author starts with the assumption that inventors
have the same total incentive to invent regardless of where they live.60 Each patent
jurisdiction's offerings are a geographically neutral entitlement, the sum of which
(Z) is the expected reward available to an inventor anywhere in the world.
B. Various Economies Capture the Benefits of Rewarding Invention with
Varying Effectiveness
Inventors may have equal opportunity to take advantage of worldwide patent
protection, but national economies do not. Some countries will be better positioned
to benefit from increased investment in research and development than others.61
For example, consider two engineers with the knowledge and resources to make an
important contribution to the field of semiconductor manufacturing-one in Cana-
da, and one in the United States. Both inventors have the same opportunity to have
their inventions protected in the most important jurisdictions for this technology
area-including China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States62-and as a re-
sult, have the same incentives to undertake the necessary research and develop-
ment. However, the Canadian and U.S. economies do not receive the same benefit
when these inventors perform their work. The United States has a much more de-
58
Paris Convention, supra note 45. Although the goal of this discussion is ultimately to inform on
international patent cooperation, the Paris Convention's longstanding establishment and wide-
spread acceptance merits treating it as background material.
An issued patent may also be understood as a series of options. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Sha-
piro, Probabilistic Patents, J. EcoN. PERSPECTIVES, Spring 2005, at 75, 80-83 (2005) (analogizing
patents to lottery tickets); Alan C. Marco, The Option Value ofPatent Litigation: Theory and Evi-
dence, 14 Rev. FINAN. ECON. 323, 323-24 (2005) (treating patents as options).
6 This assumption is admittedly overbroad. The Author returns to evaluate the consequences of this
assumption in Part IV, infra.
61
See Thomas K. Cheng, Striking a Balance between Competition Law Enforcement and Patent
Policy: A Developing Country's Perspective, in THE EFFECTS OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE BUSINESS
PRACTICES ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS 633, 646-48 (Has-
san Qaqaya & George Lipimile eds., UNCTAD 2008) (noting that the optimal balance between
patent monopoly deadweight loss and rewarding invention will vary for different categories of de-
veloping countries).
62 See generally Philip M. Parker, The 2006-2011 World Outlook for Semiconductor and Related
Device Manufacturing (ICON Group International 2005) (discussing the market potential for sem-
iconductor and related device manufacturing in countries around the world).
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veloped semiconductor sector and is better positioned to capitalize on new devel-
opments in the field regardless of where those developments are made. Canada,
by contrast, has comparatively little stake in the state of semiconductor manufactur-
ing. 4 The United States benefits more than Canada even when a Canadian engi-
neer makes the next big improvement. A country captures the benefits of an inven-
tion when it has the capability to design, manufacture, and conduct further research
65
for products based on that invention.
A country may also benefit from the opportunity to consume patented prod-
ucts invented and produced in another country. Imagine that a new disease breaks
out in a country with a limited pharmaceutical sector-like Estonia.66 A country
with a sophisticated pharmaceutical sector-like Israel67 -might be capable of de-
veloping a cure quickly, but have no domestic need for the treatment. Which coun-
try benefits more from an international regime granting worldwide patent protec-
tion for pharmaceuticals? Although royalties will flow from Estonia to Israel,
Estonia may benefit more from the treaty than Israel does because the treaty allows
the Israeli scientists to attend profitably to the Estonian disease. In the absence of
the treaty, Israeli scientists would most likely direct their attention to other, perhaps
more local problems. Estonians could lose the opportunity to receive treatment al-
together. Consumption, and not just production, leaves people better off.68
The benefits of encouraging innovation reach beyond the parties directly in-
volved in a transaction of a patented product. A premise of the patent system is
that knowledge spills over, and that even a patent-protected advance has benefits
for the technology surrounding it. The new knowledge disclosed in a patent appli-
cation may stimulate other discoveries, and, even if not disclosed,69 new discove-
63
See id. at 139, 163 (showing the projected percentage of semiconductor and related device manu-
facturing done in the United States (23.13% in 2010) and Canada (1.81% in 2010)).
64
See id. at 139 (showing the projected percentage of semiconductor and related device manufactur-
ing done in Canada (1.81% in 2010)).
65
See Cheng, supra note 61, at 654 (noting that the gains from domestic innovation are greatest for
innovative countries).
66 PANAS KANAVOS ET AL., WORLD HEALTH ORG. REG'L OFFICE FOR EUR., REVIEW OF THE ESTONIAN
PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR: TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL MEDICINES POLICY 80
(2009).
67
Alastair Bell et al., Microeconomics of Competitiveness: Israeli Biotechnology Sector 14-15, 20-
22 (May 5, 2006) (unpublished report, Harvard Business School) (on file with Harvard Business
School), available at www.isc.hbs.edu/pdf/StudentProjects/IsraelBiotechnology_2006.pdf.
68 See Chin & Grossman, supra note 11, at 19-20 (noting that protection of foreign intellectual
property is beneficial if foreign research and development is highly productive and if domestic
consumption of the product developed is high).
69
This stimulation might happen, for example, if a firm undertakes research motivated by the possi-
bility of patent protection, but later it decides to keep its discoveries as trade secrets instead.
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ries are often leaked or reverse-engineered.o Patented or not, advancements in
human knowledge are public goods,7 1 and often, the benefits of public goods are
not constrained by national borders.72
Estimating the benefit that a country receives from international patent pro-
tection is not as simple as measuring royalty flows. Rather, the model presented
below evaluates patent policy based on the total benefit received (B) by a given na-
tional economy as a result of invention being rewarded wherever it occurs.
C. Patent-Antitrust Rules Are a Factor in a Patentee's Expected Rewards
Antitrust immunity for a particular patentee practice benefits patentees while
inflicting costs on the jurisdiction granting the patent.73 Both the length of the pa-
tent term in a given jurisdiction (L) and the array of rights included in the patent
grant (R) affect the global expected return to inventors under an international patent
regime.74
To illustrate the significance of patent-antitrust policy on inventor reward,
consider an inventor holding a patent essential to the 802.11 (Wi-Fi) standard.
Some jurisdictions have an essential facilities doctrine that requires reasonable and
non-discriminatory licensing in extraordinary circumstances.75 Invoking this anti-
trust doctrine would substantially reduce the cost of both granting the patent to the
inventor and that inventor's expected reward. Alternatively, the jurisdiction could
shorten the term of all patents relating to wireless technologies, similarly reducing
the costs of the monopoly and the benefit to the inventor. For some technologies,
forcing reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing would reduce the incentive to
invent more than shortening the patent term would.76 In the case of a rapidly evolv-
70 See generally J.T. Westermeier et al., Reverse Engineering, 984 PLI/PAT. 289, 304-05 (2009)
(explaining that reverse engineering is lawful in trade secret law).
71 See Chin & Grossman, supra note 11, at 1 (noting that knowledge is generally a public good).
72 See generally Todd Sandier, Intergenerational Public Goods: Transnational Considerations, 56
SCOTTISH J. POL. EcoN. 353, 353-69 (2009) (analyzing the benefits of public goods across trans-
national borders and generations).
The Author discusses the possibility that patentee practices exert costs outside the jurisdiction
granting the patent in Part IV.
74
See Cheng, supra note 61, at 643-44 (noting that increasing the patent term or adding patent
rights increases the reward to an inventor).
The European Court of Justice generated an enormous amount of excitement when it invoked this
doctrine in Magill. See Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis v. Comm., 1995
E.C.R. 1-743, 1 46-58 (holding that refusal to license copyrights was an abuse of dominant posi-
tion and ordering compulsory licensing); Thomas C. Vinje, The Final Word on Magill: The
Judgment of the ECJ, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 297, 301 (1995) (holding that in regards to cop-
yrights, "the exercise of an exclusive right by a proprietor might, in exceptional circumstances,
involve abusive conduct").
76
Kristen M. Nugent, Patenting Medical Devices: The Economic Implications of Ethically Moti-
vated Reform, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 135, 167-69 (2002) (recognizing that compulsory licensing
may have advantages, but increasing the patent term is simpler).
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ing field, such as wireless communications, the final years of the patent are proba-
bly not worth much because there is a high probability that new developments will
make the technology obsolete by then.77 However, being forced to offer reasonable
non-discriminatory licenses would be a great loss for the patentee, since he could
no longer hold out for the full value of the patented technology.
Effective patent cooperation requires coordination of both the patent term and
the rights of the patentee under the patent grant. However, this degree of coopera-
tion is not equivalent to the complete harmonization of antitrust laws. Antitrust law
is only implicated to the extent it creates liability for practices related to procuring,
owning, licensing, and enforcing patents.
D. Putting It Together: The Costs and Benefits of a National Patent Policy
Based on the assumptions discussed above, the decision to provide national
patent protection can be modeled as follows: 78
A country setting out to design a patent system can set the length of the patent
term (Lo) and the rights, including antitrust immunities, granted to a patentee (a
vector Ro). Offering domestic patent protection causes some deadweight loss (C)
given by the function:
(1) C = C(Los lo)
Meanwhile, this national patent system produces an expected reward (P) to an in-
ventor, given by the function:
(2) Po = Po(Lo, o).
As Kaplow suggested, the country in question derives some benefit B as a function
of P. However, the next step in Kaplow's model, maximizing (Po) - C, no longer
tells the whole story. Rather, as discussed in Part II.A, Po is only part of the reward
expected by an inventor. The inventor's full expected reward (Z) is given by the
sum of the rewards available from all the patent systems in the world:
(3) Z = Zuountries pn (Ln, n)-
where Pn is the expected reward to an inventor from the patent system of country n,
and Ln and Rn are, respectively, the temporal length and the set of rights granted to
a patentee by a given country n. Note that Pn describes an expectation-the reward
77 Nancy J. Linck et al., A New Patent Examination System for the New Millennium, 35 Hous. L.
REv. 305, 312 (1998) (noting that the value of a software patent at the end of the patent term is
low, but the value of pharmaceutical patent at the end of the patent term remains high).
7 The Author feels heavily indebted to Louis Kaplow for much of the framework that follows. This
model is essentially an adaptation of the one he presented in The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A
Reappraisal to account for the availability of international patent protection. See Kaplow, supra
note 2.
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available in a given jurisdiction multiplied by the probability that an inventor will
choose to file there.79
A country's benefit from invention being rewarded by patent systems around
the world, B, is a function of Z:
(4) B = B(Z(L, R)).
As discussed in Part II.B, various countries will benefit from Z with varying de-
grees of effectiveness-that is, each country has its own function B(Z).
1. National Patent Policy without Coordination
A national patent policymaker acting in his country's self-interest will seek to
maximize the benefits received from the global patent system while minimizing the
costs of running the country's domestic patent system. In other words, he max-
imizes
(5) B (Z(L, R)) - C(Lo o)
where Lo and Fo are the levers the policymaker has at his disposal. Replacing Z
with a summation of patentee rewards Pn (see equation 3), the policymaker actually
maximizes
allcountries + alcountries
(6) B Pn (Ln, fin) C (Lo, io) = B P(Lo, o) +P.n (Ln, fn) - C(LoPo).
n=0 n=1
Because the national policymaker does not make patent policy in other countries,
the benefits received from other countries' patent systems are beyond his control.
Taking the partial derivatives of equation 6 with respect to the variables he can
control (Lo and Ro) and setting them to zero results in
aBaZaP0  aC aBaP0  aC
(7) TZ--= 0
dZdP 0 dL 0  dL0  dZ dL0  dL0
and
aB aZ aP0  aC aB aP0  aC(8)
dZ dP dR0  dR0  dZ dR0  dR0
which tells our policymaker that his country's benefits less costs are maximized
when
Small jurisdictions may contribute only slightly to Z even if they offer very strong patent protec-
tion, since tiny economies may not be worth the filing cost. Z reflects the value to an inventor of
the option to file anywhere in the world, even though it is rare for an inventor to file everywhere.
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(10) = -aC aB'
8no 8Z
Even though a national policymaker can only control his country's patent pol-
icy, the optimal amount of protection in his country depends on the total amount of
protection provided by other countries.80 If the marginal benefit of rewarding in-
vention diminishes as the total reward available to inventors increases, 1 a national
policymaker will offer more patent protection when others offer less and vice verse.
That is, when Z is close to zero, the increase in B is large for each additional in-
crease in patentees' rights in any jurisdiction-this might occur, for example, when
an adventurous country is the first to offer some new kind of intellectual property
right. A proposed new patentee right or a patent term extension would have a very
low patentee reward per unit of deadweight loss hurdle to overcome, suggesting
that the first patent jurisdiction will offer strong patent rights.
At the other extreme, when Z is large, such as when all the significant juris-
dictions are already offering generous patents rights, the increase in B is likely
small for any additional increase in patentees' rights. A proposed new patentee
right or a patent term extension would now have a very high patentee reward per
unit of deadweight loss hurdle to overcome, suggesting that later-blooming patent
jurisdictions will offer comparatively weak patent rights.82
Without some form of informal or formal cooperation, this arrangement is
unstable. If Country A sets strong patent rights, Country B will rationally decide to
set weak patent rights. However, Country A may decide that this arrangement is
unfair and weaken its patent rights in retaliation for B's free riding. In response,
Country B may then decide to set strong patent rights-and the situation has re-
80BB80 Assuming that - is not constant for all Z.
81 See Kaplow, supra note 2, at 18, 25-26 n.29
82 At least until they are punished as free riders, a possibility discussed later.
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versed itself. It is possible they will reach a natural equilibrium, 83 but on its face,
this situation calls for coordination.
2. Coordinated Patent Policy
Suppose that a group of countries decides to coordinate their patent policies.
One way they could do this is by committing to follow the decisions of a national
policymaker in a lead country.84 The participating countries, "member countries,"
would agree to have identical patent policies, while non-member countries would
continue to set their policies unilaterally. The sum of the expected reward to paten-
tees from the patent systems of these member countries is given by X, where
membercountries
(11) X(Lo,fio) = y n (Lo, Ro)
n=O
and the sum of the expected reward to patentees from the patent systems of non-
member countries is given by Y, where
nonmembercountries
(12) Y = IPn (Ln, fin)
n=1
such that
(13) Z(Lo, Ro) = X(Lo,flo) + Y.
The policymaker maximizes
(14) B[Z(Lo,Ro)] - C(Los io) = B[X(Lo,fio) + Y] - C(Lofio)
Because the national policymaker does not make patent policy in non-
member countries, the benefits received from these countries' patent systems are
beyond his control. Taking the partial derivatives of equation 14 with respect to the
variables he can control (Lo and Ro) and setting them to zero results in
8B Z8X C BX - C=0
( Z X Lo -Lo aZ aLo  aL0
and
83
See infra Part III for a discussion of the likelihood of reaching equilibrium with regard to patent-
antitrust policy.
84
Of course, this is an oversimplification-the various members of this arrangement would want to
have their own input into policymaking. However, the distribution of power within the member
countries is irrelevant. The Author needs only assume that they are able to reach agreement
somehow.
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aB Z ax(16) aZaXRo
which imply
ax


















(20) = - n
n=o
If 2 and are greater than zero for all member countries,8 then X 2Pn
ax aP,
and a- . Comparing equations 17 and 18 to equations 9 and 10, it is appar-
ent that members of a patent treaty will elect to have stronger patent protection than
they would if they were making policy without coordination. A unilateral increase
in patent scope will need to overcome the threshold set out in equations 9 and 10.
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But, if other countries commit to making the same increase, the contributions to X
made by the other countries' increase in patent scope will help the proposed policy
over the threshold. Thus, regardless of the total level of patent protection in the
world, countries will tend to grant stronger patent protection when they cooperate
than when they do not.
This does not mean that it always makes sense for a group of cooperating
countries to offer patent protection at all. When the worldwide level of patent pro-
tection is high, the marginal return to rewarding invention will be small, and it may
be inefficient for even a cooperating group of countries to start offering patent pro-
tection. For example, it is possible that a group of countries will jointly decide that
free riding on the rest of the world's patent systems would maximize their own wel-
fare. However, holding L constant, a national policymaker will find stronger pa-
tent protection more desirable when other countries agree to implement similar pro-
tection.
3. Partially Coordinated Patent Policy
Finally, suppose a group of countries coordinates their patent policies but
leaves patent-antitrust questions to the discretion of the individual members." For
example, consider a patent policymaker whose choice of patent term (L) will be
followed by other countries, but who only has authority to set the scope of antitrust
immunities for his own country.
The told expected reward to inventors is now given by:
membercountries
(21) X(Lo,o) = Pn(LO, fn)
n=o
because the reward offered by all member countries depends on Lo, but only the
reward offered by the policymaker's countries depends on Ro.
The policymaker now seeks to maximize
(22) B[X(Lo, o) + Y] - C(Los o).
He does this by setting the derivatives with respect to both Lo and Ro to zero.
When the policymaker takes the derivative with respect to Lo, he obtains the same
result as in equation 15:
86
As discussed in Part III, this is essentially the substance of the TRIPS Agreement.
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OBOZ8X aC_ BX BC
(23) -X --=O-0  0.aZ aX BLo aLo HZ aLo aLo
That is, the policymaker will set the length of the patent term the same as if the
countries were coordinating all aspects of their patent policy.
When the policymaker takes the partial derivative with respect to Ro he gets
OB8ZOX OC OBOX OC
(24) ----- - - - = ---- - -- = 0.
However, because member countries will follow only the policymaker's lead for
the patent term, Po, is the only component of X that depends on Ro. Therefore,
X= = - and the policymaker actually seeks to achieve:
aBB BoRB
(25) =-: = 0.
8Z 8Ro aRo
Compared to the result stemming from equation 8, the policymaker will set
patent-antitrust policy in the same way as if the countries were not coordinating
their patent policies at all. Uncoordinated antitrust immunities will be weaker than
they would be if the member countries were also coordinating their patent-antitrust
policies.
If a national policymaker follows the guidance of equations 23 and 25, he will
set his national patent policy such that
aX
D~ 1





Note that partial coordination creates a preference for extending patent terms
rather than for increasing patent-antitrust immunities. Suppose the policymaker
can choose to implement either Policy A, an increase in the patent term, or Policy
B, an increase in antitrust immunity. Even if Policy A is a less efficient technique
for rewarding invention (i.e., it provides less reward to patentees per unit of cost), it
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is possible that the policymaker will select Policy A over Policy B, because Policy
A's increase in the patent term will be matched by the other member countries.
Because of the distorting influence of the partial coordination regime, policymakers
will select term extensions with lower marginal returns over increases in antitrust
immunity with higher marginal returns.
Of course, it is unrealistic that a single national policymaker has complete au-
thority to adjust patent terms in all the member countries. Rather, when countries
coordinate the patent term, they typically negotiate it in advance, and fix it in a
treaty that is not easy to modify.87 As a result, the primary tool remaining in the
hands of any national policymaker will be control of patent-antitrust policy.88 Op-
timizing patent-antitrust policy unilaterally under equation 27, the policymaker will
often find it unfavorable to grant any further patentee rights. If a large number of
significant patent jurisdictions have joined the treaty, Z will already be high, and
BB
a will be small. In other words, the marginal benefit to the country from an addi-
tional reward to inventors is slight. Without coordination, there may be few anti-
trust immunities that can overcome the high hurdle set by these conditions. There-
fore, it is expected that a treaty fixing the patent term, but leaving patent-antitrust
policy to the discretion of member states, would lead to increased antitrust liability
for patentees.
Countries could mitigate this effect by separately coordinating patent-antitrust
policies informally, a possibility considered in Part III.D. First, however, this Ar-
ticle evaluates the formal agreements coordinating international patent policy to-
day.
III. A Visit to the Real World: The TRIPS Agreement
The model presented above predicts that preferences for national patent poli-
cy will depend on the extent and form of international cooperation. This Article
now turns to the most significant patent treaty in force today, the TRIPS Agree-
ment, to evaluate the national incentives created by this prevailing treaty regime.
A. The Patent Protection Requirements of TRIPS
TRIPS includes several basic principles as well as specific minimum stan-
dards of intellectual property protection. With regard to patents, TRIPS requires
member states to issue a patent for any invention that is new, involves an inventive
87
Although other methods of coordination are theoretically possible, cooperation through a binding
treaty appears to be the only form that has been successfully implemented. See infra Part III.D
(discussing extra-treaty cooperation).
88
Technically, the policymaker may be able to extend the national patent term beyond the minimum
requirements of the treaty, but a unilateral increase in the patent term faces the same hurdles as a
potential increase in patentee antitrust immunities: the marginal benefit of increasing patentee re-
wards will likely be low, and the country that extends the scope of the patent will bear the full cost
of increasing patentee rewards while receiving only part of the benefit.
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step, and is capable of industrial application.89 This patent protection must extend
for 20 years from the filing date,90 and must include the right to exclude others
from "making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing" infringing products.9 1
The patent grant can not depend on the place of invention or the field of technolo-
gy.92
If a member state offers intellectual property protection exceeding these min-
imum standards, either to its own nationals or to a group of foreign nationals, it
must offer that same protection to nationals of all member states. 93 This provision
is likely to hamper future bargaining for reciprocal recognition of additional paten-
tee rights with a subset of member states. If a member state chooses to increase pa-
tent protection, it must offer this increase in protection to nationals of all member
states, whether or not other member states make a reciprocal increase in protection.
By ratifying TRIPS, member states committed to offering a patent system that
was blind to the location of invention and open to all the nationals of all other
member states. 9 4 But the member states also committed to a specified patent term,
thereby sacrificing their abilities to decrease (though remaining free to increase) the
length of time those patents remain in force.95
B. TRIPS and Antitrust
Despite setting minimum requirements for national patent protection, the
TRIPS Agreement left most of patent-antitrust policy to the discretion of the mem-
ber states. The treaty twice acknowledges the right of member states to enforce an-
titrust laws against patent holders. First, there is the general principle of Article
8(2) that "[a]ppropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provi-
sions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual proper-
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 27(1).
90 Id. at art. 33.
Id. at art. 28.
92 Id. at art. 27(a).
Id. at arts. 3(1) & 4; see Jerome H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual
Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 23, 26 (Carlos M. Correa & Ab-
dulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998) (discussing the equal treatment provisions in article 4). However,
the requirement to open intellectual property benefits to everyone is subject to certain exceptions.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, at arts. 5, 65 & 66.
94 Paris Convention, supra note 45, at art. 2. In some cases, states re-committed, because many were
already parties to the Paris Convention, which provided a basic right to national treatment.
In the case of the United States, TRIPS ratification required changing the mechanism for calculat-
ing a patent term. This change effectively extended the term of patents in some technology areas
while shortening the term in others. See Abrams, supra note 38, at 1621 (stating that the patent
term was changed from a term of seventeen years from the date of the patent grant to twenty year
from the date of the application, which increases the length of the patent term if the patent
processing time is less than three years, and decreases the length of the patent term if the patent
processing time is more than three years).
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ty rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade
or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.""
Various commentators, and at least one WTO panel, have suggested that this
reservation of antitrust enforcement powers to the member states should be inter-
preted broadly. 97 Abuse of intellectual property rights does not require market do-
mination, or even behavior ordinarily thought to be anticompetitive. The use of the
intellectual property right need only be "illegitimate" or contrary to the goals of en-
couraging innovation or disseminating technology.98
With regard to licensing practices, Article 40(2) of the TRIPS Agreement is
even more explicit regarding the scope of Member State authority:
Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in their na-
tional legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases
constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on
competition in the relevant market. As provided above, a Member may adopt,
consistently with the other provisions of this Agreement, appropriate measures to
prevent or control such practices, which may include for example exclusive
grantback conditions, conditions preventing challenges to validity and coercive
package licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and regulations of that Mem-
ber.99
Under Article 40(2), "licensing practices or conditions" have been understood
to include refusals to license, discriminatory grants of licenses, and restrictive li-
cense clauses.'00 Member states have great latitude in determining the practices
that constitute abuses of intellectual property rights, so long as the measure of
abuse is a given practice's deleterious effect on competition.' 0 It is also acceptable
to have per se rules declaring patentee conduct anticompetitive, provided those
rules are based on actual competitive concerns.102
96
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 8(2).
Tu Thanh Nguyen & Hans Henrik Lidgard, The CFI Microsoft Judgment and TRIPS Competition
Flexibilities, 16 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 41, 44 (2008); Panel Report, Mexico - Measures
Affecting Telecommunications Services, WT/DS204/R (Apr. 2, 2004).
98 UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 548 (2005).
99
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 40(2).
100
UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 98, at 556.
101 Id. at 559.
102 Id.; Andreas Heinemann, Antitrust Law of Intellectual Property in the TRIPS Agreement of the
World Trade Organization, in FROM GATT To TRIPS: THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED
ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 239, 246 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker
eds., 1996). The industrialized countries reportedly resisted the possibility of per se rules for anti-
competitive patentee behavior, but they conceded them once they realized that a circumstantial
individual review of a patentee's practice could obtain the same result. See UNCTAD-ICTSD,
supra note 98, at 545-46.
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Although these Articles appear to recognize member state antitrust enforce-
ment authority, they are widely interpreted as implying limits on that authority.'03
Phrases like "appropriate measures" and "consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement" are generally understood to restrain member states' authority to take
certain measures against intellectual property right-holders.104
However, if these Articles are an example of formal antitrust cooperation,
they are an extremely limited one. The restraints in Articles 8 and 40 would only
be triggered if a member state took extreme-perhaps unprecedented-antitrust po-
sitions against holders of intellectual property rights.'0 5 TRIPS does not attempt to
establish substantive antitrust immunities, nor does it coordinate patent-antitrust
policy more generally.
What good is antitrust cooperation if it only amounts to an agreement not to
be extraordinarily hostile to patentees? Perhaps these limited provisions address
the concern that a member state might use antitrust policy to dismember its TRIPS
obligations entirely. 0 6 TRIPS does not require any particular patent-antitrust poli-
cy within the universe of reasonable options; it is implicated only if when antitrust
enforcement leads to the "general curtailment of intellectual property protec-
tion." 0
Because of the wide latitude given to member states to set patent-antitrust
policy, TRIPS is best categorized as an example of the partially coordinated patent
policy described in Part II.B.3. The treaty formally coordinates certain policies af-
fecting patentee reward, such as term length and the enforcement rights, while
member states have discretion over other policies, such as those involving antitrust
immunities. Although TRIPS may impose some requirements on permissible anti-
103
See, e.g., UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 98, at 559-60 (recognizing that "on the one hand, Article
40.2 fully confirms Members' sovereign power to specify in their national legislation which li-
censing practices or conditions they consider to be abusive and anti-competitive; and on the other,
it seems to limit that discretion by stating that such practices or conditions 'may in particular cases
constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the
relevant market'); Eleanor M. Fox, Trade, Competition, and Intellectual Property-TRIPS and
its Antitrust Counterparts, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 481, 485-90 (1996) (stating that TRIPS
sets limits on competition laws because it recognizes that aggressive antitrust enforcement could
harm intellectual property protection); Nguyen & Lidgard, supra note 97, at 46 (discussing how
Articles 8(2) and 40(2) limit member states' power to adopt anti-competition legislation to be
consistent with TRIPS).
'04 UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 98, at 560 (stating that Article 40(2) "requires Members to limit the
measures to prevent anticompetitive practices to what is 'appropriate').
105 See Fox, supra note 103, at 492. Fox suggested that Articles 8 and 40 provide something like a
good faith standard-any antitrust policy with reasonable bounds will be compliant with TRIPS.
For example, she argued that "existing developed systems of antitrust are presumptively legiti-
mate, even though they may function as a limitation on intellectual property rights." Id.
106
See Fox, supra note 103, at 486-87 (acknowledging potential clashes between TRIPS protection
and competition law, and drawing a line where competition law may not go).
107 UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 98, at 551-52; Fox, supra note 103, at 552.
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trust policies, these requirements are so minimal that almost any policy capable of
increasing competition-even to the great detriment of patentees-can satisfy the
TRIPS requirements. To the extent that the treaty addresses antitrust policy, it is
only to ensure that member states offer something resembling intellectual property
rights-not that they offer minimally substantive antitrust immunities.
The model presented in Part II therefore predicts that membership in TRIPS
would be associated with increased antitrust liability for patentees, particularly in
jurisdictions that extended their patent terms to join TRIPS. 08 Antitrust policies
that would be beneficial to many countries if uniformly adopted likely remain un-
implemented, because the benefits of granting antitrust immunities are shared glo-
bally and the costs are borne locally. Patent protection is not necessarily too weak;
it is possible that the negotiators of TRIPS set longer patent terms to compensate
for expected weak antitrust immunities. But regardless of the optimal total level of
patentee rewards achieved by TRIPS, the model suggests that this level is obtaina-
ble at a lower cost through more comprehensive coordination of patent-antitrust
policy.
C. Non-Consensual TRIPS
Lurking in the background of any discussion of the purpose and effect of a
TRIPS provision is the divergence of interests between developing and developed
countries. The consensus is that mandatory IP protection was not in the best inter-
est of developing countries, and that these countries agreed to TRIPS only in re-
sponse to coercion from more developed countries. 09 After all, stronger patent
protection is not necessarily better for everyone.
Diverging preferences for the level of patent protection is consistent with the
model presented in Part II. Under this model, countries will enjoy varying levels of
108
Some countries, particularly those who benefit greatly when worldwide patentee rewards are high,
may always desire stronger patentee rewards than other jurisdictions are willing to provide.
Therefore, they may continue to offer generous antitrust immunities to patentees post-TRIPS even
if the treaty does not oblige them to do so. Countries that have increased patent terms to join
TRIPS are more likely to have little interest in increasing the worldwide reward available to pa-
tentees, and may be less likely to try to increase rewards through unilateral action, such as offer-
ing generous antitrust immunities.
See PUGATCH, supra note 11, at 64-69 (suggesting that trade retaliation caused many developing
countries to increase their IP protection when it was not otherwise in their best interests); Brad-
ford, supra note 39, at 14-16 (suggesting that trade retaliation and the requirement to agree to
TRIPS to receive the benefits from GATT and WTO membership caused developing countries to
agree to TRIPS, even though they were primarily customers of IP related products); Anu Brad-
ford, International Antitrust Regime, TRIPs and Different Paths to Regulatory Convergence 9-10
(Feb. 4, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the American Society of International Law)
(recognizing that developing countries had little to gain from TRIPS because they were primarily
consumers of IP products but that they agreed to TRIPS out of fear of trade retaliation, and be-
cause the United States and E.U. withdrew from previous trade obligations of the previous GATT,
forcing developing countries to accept TRIPS as a precondition to any benefits negotiated in new
the GATT).
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benefits in response to increased global patentee rewards (i.e., they will have dif-
ferent B functions). Without outside influences, a country that would only slightly
benefit through a coordinated increase in patentee rewards will rationally sit out the
increase. 110
Moreover, it makes sense that countries obtaining greater marginal benefits
from increased patentee rewards would make side payments to countries obtaining
less marginal benefits in order to reach an agreement on stronger patent regimes.' 1
When a country with greater capacity to benefit from increased patentee rewards
wants to increase patentee rewards, it has two options. First, the country could in-
crease the strength of its own patent system. However, these increases in patentee
reward will come at a high cost. If a country gets a large benefit from patent pro-
tection, it likely will have already offered relatively strong domestic rights, and
providing additional reward will require resorting to less economical policies.
Second, countries could pay other countries to strengthen their patent sys-
tems. Because countries receiving less reward from patent protection will have rel-
atively weak domestic rights, greater gains in patentee reward will be available at
lower cost by cooperating with other jurisdictions. Bargaining allows countries en-
joying large benefits from rewarding patentees to transfer a portion of these bene-
fits to countries who would otherwise have no interest in increasing patentee re-
wards.
The divergence of interests underlying TRIPS could lead to several conclu-
sions regarding the failure to standardize patent-antitrust policy. One possible con-
clusion is that the failure to restrain antitrust enforcement more significantly was a
major oversight on the part of the developed countries that traded other benefits for
TRIPS accession. Although Articles 8 and 40 of TRIPS would not allow develop-
ing countries to declare all patent activity anticompetitive, they do give developing
countries latitude to offer extremely weak antitrust immunities to patentees.
An alternate conclusion is that the current latitude in antitrust was not an
oversight, but rather was part of the bargain. The developing countries may have
required side payments in excess of the value that these antitrust policies would
have had to developed countries. But this theory does not answer the efficiency
concerns; in fact, it contradicts the intuition that the developed countries have as
i10 This cost-benefit takes place against the backdrop of the Paris Convention, which ensures that na-
tionals of non-participants have a right to file for patents in TRIPS jurisdictions, even if their
home country did not offer any patent protection at all. Paris Convention, supra note 45, at art. 3
("Nationals of countries outside the Union who are domiciled or who have real ad effective indus-
trial or commercial establishments in the territory of one of the countries of the Union shall be
treated in the same manner as nationals of the countries of the Union.")
Ill
As discussed in Part II, coordination among countries with equivalent abilities to capitalize on
patentee reward certainly has its benefits as well. However, when everyone has the same inter-
ests, there is often little that requires bargaining.
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much or more to gain from trading for antitrust immunities as they do from trading
for patent term guarantees. If the patent term offered by developing countries has
already been increased through side payments, the next marginal dollar would be
better spent buying antitrust immunities than it would be spent buying a longer pa-
tent term. Perhaps the developed countries should relax their patent term demands
and instead increased pressure on developing countries to commit to strong paten-
tee antitrust immunities.
One response to this criticism is that antitrust immunities are more difficult to
define and more costly to enforce. The length of a patent term is readily verifiable,
and a country that failed to meet its obligations-for example, by passing a law that
granted patentees nineteen years of protection-would be subject to WTO sanc-
tions. Antitrust enforcement is significantly more nuanced and fact-intensive. Un-
less a member state made patentee practices protected by TRIPS per se unlawful, it
would be difficult for other member states to intervene on behalf of individual pa-
tentees. Moreover, a member state that wants to shirk its antitrust obligations could
often achieve the same result using a rule-of-reason analysis. Though individual
cases of overzealous prosecution of patentees could be brought before the WTO,
developed countries may have concluded that an increase in patent term was simply
a cleaner concession.
Even if it were unfeasible to extract further antitrust concessions from devel-
oping countries, it seems that it would have been beneficial for developed countries
to coordinate patent-antitrust policies more extensively amongst themselves. As
discussed in Part II, coordination can produce benefits even without full participa-
tion. Those countries with an interest in providing greater patent protection than
the baseline requirements of TRIPS could enter an additional agreement to offer
supplementary patent protection such as explicit patentee antitrust immunities.
TRIPS, however, does not accommodate such multi-tiered arrangements; it is a
one-size-fits-all package.' 12 If there is such an agreement among developed coun-
tries, it does not exist within TRIPS.
D. Extra-Treaty Coordination
The lack of patent-antitrust coordination within TRIPS does not preclude
such coordination taking place either informally or under another treaty. The latter
can be shortly dismissed: there is no other treaty that coordinates patent-antitrust
policy among a subset of countries desiring to implement stronger patent protec-
112 This is an overstatement. Developing countries have the option of delaying full implementation
of TRIPS for up to ten years. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, at arts. 65 & 66. However, this
leniency is temporary and does not address the inefficiencies resulting from the failure to coordi-
nate antitrust policy.
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tion.' 13 However, the possibility of informal coordination calls for more detailed
consideration. When certain conditions are met, a series of interdependent moves
may result in an equilibrium equivalent to what the parties would have agreed to
had they entered a formal treaty.1 4 This stable equilibrium could be achieved ei-
ther by coincidence of interest, coercion, or true cooperation."'
Coincidence of interest occurs when states obtain private advantages from a
particular action irrespective of the actions of other states." 6 There is likely some
coincidence of interests among countries that obtain significant benefits from in-
creases in patentee rewards; consequently, there may be several patent jurisdictions
that will elect to raise patentee rewards unilaterally. However, the gains from un-
ilateral action have already been assumed. By hypothesis, countries are dealing
with the deficiencies that cannot be solved by coincidence of interest.
Coercion occurs when one state forces other states to engage in actions that
serve the first state's interests." 7 Like coincidence of interest, coercion likely oc-
curs at the international intersection of patent and antitrust law. The United States
has a longstanding history of coercing countries to enforce IP rights," 8 and has
made more lenient patent-antitrust policy a condition for settling a WTO dispute
with Argentina.119 However, under the WTO framework, member states may im-
pose trade sanctions only for cause. 120 If a member state is compliant with its
TRIPS obligations-which, as discussed above, have an extremely weak patent-
antitrust component-there may be no basis for another member state to impose
sanctions. Thus, the WTO may have limited the ability of states to use coercion to
increase patentee rewards.
Finally, genuine cooperation can occur when the costs and benefits facing the
states create a repeat prisoner's dilemma.121 For example, this situation would oc-
113
The only exception is the Treaty of Rome, which provides for unification of antitrust policy more
generally but only for E.U. member states. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity art. 85, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3.
114 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. Cm. L.
REv. 1113, 1120-21 (1999) (discussing how countries cooperate without explicit agreements).
115 Id. at 1122-27.
116 Id. at 1122.
117 Id. at 1123.
Susan K. Sell, Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust in the Developing World: Crisis,
Coercion, and Choice, 49 INT'L ORG. 315, 321-32 (1995).
119 See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Argentina-Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals
and Test Data Protection for Agricultural Chemicals, WT/DS 171/3, 2002 WL 1342807, at *2
(June 20, 2002) (discussing the agreement).
120 See World Intellectual Property Organization, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes-A
Unique Contribution, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/displ e.htm (last vi-
sited Oct. 21, 2010) (stating that disputes between WTO countries are decided unilaterally).
121 Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 114, at 1124-25.
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cur if two states received the greatest possible benefit when both increased patentee
antitrust immunities at the same time, but a state increasing antitrust immunities by
itself would obtain the worst possible outcome. So long as the game continues,
each round increases the odds that the states will arrive at the optimal outcome.122
Once both states have implemented mutually beneficial patent-antitrust policies,
they will keep those policies until an exogenous event destabilizes the equili-
brium.123
Several characteristics for the patent-antitrust dilemma diminish the prospect
of reaching an optimal outcome informally. First, there are over 170 potential pa-
tent jurisdictions to coordinate.124 Also, many of these jurisdictions have divergent
interests,'25 and there may be genuine disagreement about the optimal level of pa-
tentee reward, even among similarly situated countries. Finally, monitoring the an-
titrust immunities given to patentees is extremely challenging. Patent-antitrust cas-
es arise infrequently, and even after the fact it can be difficult to estimate the
degree of harm actually caused by a patentee's conduct.126 Noise in monitoring can
cause policymakers to misjudge each other's intentions, and coordinated behavior
may soon fall apart.12 7 If patent-antitrust policy is too costly to monitor and mea-
ningfully compare through the formal TRIPS framework, it is unlikely that infor-
mal interdependent cooperation can solve the problem.
For these reasons, the deficiencies of TRIPS are real. It is unlikely that in-
formal cooperation can supply what the Agreement omitted.
E. Evaluating TRIPS
The TRIPS Agreement does too little to coordinate patent-antitrust policy and
will lead to more expensive provision of patentee rewards than would be available
through more extensive cooperation. This result is troubling regardless of one's
view of the proper level of inventor reward. Whatever a patentee's expected re-
ward ought to be (a complicated and often divisive question), it could be delivered
at lower cost through increased cooperation.
122 Id. at 1125.
123 Id. at 1125-27.
124
Members and Observers, supra note 51. There could also be significant gains from coordinating
as few as the five or six of the largest patent jurisdictions. However, spite for free riding players
has the potential to destabilize the cooperative effort.
125
See generally PUGATCH, supra note 11 (noting at various points the differing intellectual property
interests of different groups).
126
See Bradford, supra note 39, at 27 (stating that patent-antitrust coordination is unpredictable).
127 See James D. Morrow, Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution Versus
Information, 48 INT'L ORG. 387, 394 (1994) ("If the noise in monitoring leads the players to mis-
judge the other's prior move, tit-for-tat quickly loses its desired characteristics.").
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Although full-fledged antitrust cooperation may be implausible, there is rea-
son to think that patent-antitrust cooperation could succeed where general harmoni-
zation efforts have failed. A convincing explanation for the contrast between the
success of the TRIPS negotiations and the failure of antitrust harmonization efforts
is the difference in foreseeability of outcomes.128 A patent treaty creates clear dis-
tributional winners and losers, while the effects of antitrust agreement are murky
and unpredictable.12 9 Clear distributional outcomes enable side payments and issue
linkages, while uncertainty triggers risk aversion.
Framing the failure of antitrust harmonization discussions in this way, the
components of patent-antitrust policy absent from TRIPS look more like patent and
less like antitrust policy. Increased patentee rewards in the form of new antitrust
immunities would create clear winners and losers, at least at the national level, with
distributional effects that are knowable and compensable. Unlike antitrust harmo-
nization in general, patent-antitrust harmonization looks like a problem that negoti-
ations should be able to solve.
Increased patent-antitrust coordination is both possible and desirable. Coop-
eration could bring about the twofold benefits of increased patentee rewards and
reduced social costs-an opportunity to make everyone better off. The patent-
antitrust intersection is thus ripe for further international negotiation.
IV. Refining the Model
This section evaluates several of the assumptions of the model presented in
Part II and discusses how that part's conclusions would change if those assump-
tions did not hold.
A. Domestic Patent Protection Creates Costs Abroad
In the model presented in Part II, the Author assumed that the full cost of of-
fering patent protection was borne by the country granting the patent. Since the
costs of rewarding invention were fully internalized, but the benefits were not,
there was an incentive for countries to provide weaker protection than they would if
costs and benefits were fully captured. In reality, however, some of the costs of li-
miting competition through the grant of a patent may be borne by other countries.
Taken to the extreme, it may be that countries are overprotecting invention because
they are getting a share in the benefits of rewarding invention, while dumping the
costs onto other countries.
There are several ways that domestic patent-antitrust policy could negatively
affect foreign markets. Restricted competition in one market may naturally spill
128 See Bradford, supra note 39, at 26-27 (stating that the outcomes from TRIPS were "clear and
quantifiable ex ante" while it is not clear who would benefit from antitrust coordination).
129 Id
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over into another market. For example, an expensive royalty or injunction in one
patent jurisdiction could reduce competition in other jurisdictions by preventing po-
tential competitors from obtaining economies of scale.' 30 A potential entrant in a
patent-free market may find entry uneconomical unless he can enter the patent-
protected market as well.
This economy-of-scale theory presupposes that patent protection is available
in countries comprising a large portion of the market. A single country's grant of a
domestic patent monopoly scarcely affects international competition, provided that
enough markets without patent protection remain available. For most goods, this
would be the case until many countries agreed to offer strong patent protection. A
country offering no patent protection would experience deadweight loss once most
other countries began offering patent protection. In other words, loss of economy
of scale serves as a kind of natural restriction on free riding. It imposes costs on
countries that hold out from offering patent protection but has little impact on the
decision of the first country to reward invention. Standing alone, a country's fail-
ure to internalize the loss of economies of scale in foreign markets seems unlikely
to result in the overprotection of inventions.
On another extreme, it is possible to imagine an aggressive country that de-
fined infringement under its patent laws as production or use anywhere in the
world. For example, if a U.S. patent created liability for activities abroad, the Unit-
ed States could impose deadweight losses on other countries' economies.' 3 1 Doing
so, however, would violate existing norms of international comity that counsel
against giving national laws extraterritorial effect. 132 In fact, this might be the old-
est and most consistent form of informal cooperation; courts around the world are
reluctant to impose patent infringement liability for conduct that occurred entirely
outside national borders.
In between these extremes, there lies a wide range of patentee conduct that
could reduce international competition if tolerated domestically. For example, a
domestic cross-licensing arrangement could have the effect of dividing markets in-
ternationally. A patent settlement could be used as a cover for fixing prices world-
'30
They could also prevent other cost reductions that result from increased experience.
This is true, at least, for suits involving companies having sufficient resources or activities in the
United States to be subject to judgment in a U.S. court.
132
For example, in the United States, Acts of Congress are subject to a presumption against extrater-
ritoriality because "foreign conduct is generally the domain of foreign law." Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454-55 (2007) (quotations omitted); see Paul B. Stephan, Against
International Cooperation, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE
GLOBAL EcoNOMY 66, 81-82 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004) (discussing the
history of the effects test in the United States); see generally Joined Cases C-89/85, C- 104/85, C-
114/85, C-116/85, C-125/85, C-126/85, C-127/85, C-128/85 & C-129/85, A. Ahlstrom Osakeyh-
tio v. Comm'n of the European Comtys., 1988 E.C.R. 5193 (discussing the rule of noninterference
used in Europe).
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wide.133 Refusing to license a patent in one jurisdiction could be a whty of discip-
lining price competition in another jurisdiction.
However, the antitrust laws of the country granting the patent are not the only
protection against the patent's anticompetitive effects. Under the widely used "ef-
fects test," a country has authority to regulate anticompetitive conduct that has an
effect in its borders, without regard to where the conduct itself occurred.13 4 Thus,
parties agreeing to territorial restrictions around a patent license in one country
could nonetheless be liable for antitrust violations in another country where the
presence of a patent at the center of the arrangement may provide no defense.
The apparent discrepancy in norms of international comity in these two
areas 3 5 reduces the total rewards expected by patentees. In order to prove in-
fringement, a patentee must point to conduct in the jurisdiction that granted the pa-
tent. At the same time, licensing that patent could subject the patentee to liability
anywhere in the world, wherever the agreement has the effect of limiting competi-
tion. The combination of these contrasting rules for extraterritorial application of
domestic law limits the ability of a national policymaker to shift the costs of patent
protection onto other economies.
The possibility of costs being borne by other jurisdictions would only change
the conclusions of the model if these externalized costs were large in comparison to
the benefit a country accrues from inventions being rewarded worldwide. Empiri-
cal observations suggest that this is not the case. Every modem patent treaty has
established patent minima; concern for domestic overprotection is not the motiva-
tion for international cooperation.13 6
133 There is intense debate about the likelihood of patent settlements being used to facilitate illegal
domestic arrangements. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir.
2003) (holding that an agreement not to enter the United States market is per se illegal under the
Sherman Act); Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 256 F.3d 799, 809-10, 812, 815 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (stating that a generic drug company that is the first to file an ANDA agreeing with the
patent holder of the pioneer drug to delay entry into the market when the generic drug company
has FDA approval could be unlawful restraint on trade); Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Are
Settlements of Patent Disputes Illegal Per Se?, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 491, 538 (2002) (stating that
whether a patent settlement in a pharmaceutical case is anticompetitive depends on the facts and
circumstances); Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property
Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1728-29 (2003) (stating that an IP dispute does not affect
whether a practice is anticompetitive, but only affects whether the anticompetitive practice is ac-
ceptable).
134 Stephan, supra note 132, at 81-82; see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796
(1993) (discussing the effects test).
3 Compare Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. at 454-55 (understanding that United States patent law does
not extend to foreign activities), with Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 764 (finding that the Sherman
Act applies to foreign conduct that intended to and did produce a substantial effect in the United
States).
136 This is because countries have adopted antitrust jurisprudence that protects them from the over-
reaching effects of foreign patent systems. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
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B. Inventors in Different Locations Have Different Incentives to Invent
Part II treated all inventors as valuing the array of available patent jurisdic-
tions without regard to where any particular inventor is located in the world. This
is not the same as valuing all patent jurisdictions equally; it only means that an in-
ventor in India and an inventor in China value the U.S. patent system equivalently.
It may go too far, however, to assume that the inventor in India values the Chinese
system as much as the inventor in China does. Therefore, the Author will evaluate
the effects of an inventor's home patent system comprising a disproportionate share
of the inventor's expected reward.
If inventors place more value on their home patent system, then Z varies by
location; inventors in jurisdictions with stronger patent protection will have greater
incentives to invent than inventors in jurisdictions with weaker patent protection.
For example, an inventor in late 19 th century Switzerland-which, at the time, had
no patent system137-may have had less incentive to invent than a similarly situated
inventor in Germany. Under the Paris Convention, both inventors had equal access
to the German patent system. Yet the Swiss person's inventions would not have
been protected in his home market; he could not enjoy a reward until he either en-
tered the German market or licensed his German patent. External barriers to either
of these routes may leave the Swiss inventor less inclined to invest in research
compared to his German peer.
If inventors prefer their home patent systems, and if a country gets an extra
benefit from inventions occurring inside its borders,138 then the model will tend to
overstate the benefits of free riding on other countries' patent systems. A country
that under-protects invention will lose opportunities for additional inventive activi-
ty to occur within its borders. Nonetheless, as long as some of the benefits of re-
warding invention are shared with countries where the invention did not occur, na-
Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 (1969) (finding that a U.S. company had been damaged by antitrust beha-
vior in Canada).
137 See PUGATCH, supra note 11, at 65 (noting that Switzerland had no patent system until 1887).
This is partly, but not entirely, the case. Investment in science provides desirable jobs, increases
the skill set of the local workforce, and may foster development of a regional pocket of expertise.
See Giles Duranton & Diego Puga, Micro-foundations of Urban Agglomeration Economies, in
HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN EcoNoMics 2063 (J. Vernon Henderson & Jacques F.
Thisse eds., 2004) ("Sustained growth ... requires that new innovations are proportional to the
quantity of past innovations."); Bruce Fallick et al., Job-Hopping in Silicon Valley: Some Evi-
dence Concerning the Microfoundations of a High-Technology Cluster, 88 REV. OF ECON. &
STAT. 472, 481 (2006) (stating that employee mobility in the computer industry in Silicon Valley
hampers investment in innovation by reducing the reward for doing so). But there are other bene-
fits that have nothing to do with the location of an invention. Increases in human knowledge will
produce benefits regardless of where that knowledge comes from. For example, the beneficiary of
a new drug treatment is likely indifferent to the location where the research underlying that treat-
ment occurred.
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tional incentives will lean towards policies that systematically under-reward inven-
tion.
V. Conclusion
As Louis Kaplow pointed out in 1984, issues at the intersection of patent and
antitrust law should be decided with reference to the cost of benefits available
through other mechanisms of patent law. Patents are designed to reduce competi-
tion-exactly so that the promise of market power will lead inventors to expend re-
sources in research and development. The goal of patent policy is to grant that
market power in a way that is most attractive to patentees at minimal cost to every-
one else.
However, today's national policymaker is not alone in the endeavor. There
are significant spillovers, mostly of benefits, flowing both in and out of the typical
patent jurisdiction. These cross-border interactions do not change the basic goal of
patent policy, but they do distort incentives. A national policymaker has every rea-
son to under-commit and under-deliver-to let the rest of the world reward inven-
tion while his jurisdiction enjoys the benefits at reduced cost.
Coordination is the solution to distortions caused by uncapturable externali-
ties. Efforts to harmonize policy internationally have been partially successful but
have failed to coordinate patent and antitrust law with equal force. Under norms of
international comity, in the literature, and within the TRIPS Agreement itself, pa-
tent policy is treated as worthy of being coordinated, while patent-antitrust policy is
largely left out. As a result, some of the policy levers affecting the incentive to in-
vent are controlled through detailed agreements enforceable by WTO sanction;
others are left to the outcome of a 170 player prisoner's dilemma.
The results of this schism are twofold. First, patent policy has not yet been
truly coordinated across international borders. There remains both the incentive
and the opportunity for countries to under-reward invention without fully suffering
the consequences. Second, patent policy has not yet been truly coordinated with
itself. Kaplow's model of an improved patent system, in which the most reward is
offered to inventors at the least cost to society, has been lost in the shift to an inter-
national patent regime.
Increased cooperation has the potential to deliver two distinct benefits. Coor-
dinating patent antitrust immunities could increase the worldwide incentive to in-
vent to its optimal level, resulting in more investment research and faster advances
in human knowledge. But even for those who are skeptical of the need for in-
creased inventor rewards, more extensive coordination could deliver the desired
level of inventor reward (whatever it is) at a lower cost. A reunited approach to pa-
tent policy offers something for everyone-more reward at lower cost. Even if
general harmonization of antitrust policy is infeasible or undesirable, questions at
the patent-antitrust intersection are ripe for further cooperation.
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